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A FLAGRANT INJUSTICE LEGALIZED BY THE
BANKRUPTCY LAW1
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar

T IS popularly presumed that in most bankruptcy proceedings the Act was or is invoked by one who had
engaged in an extensive business and became unduly vexed
or oppressed by rapacious creditors. Lawyers know, however, that petitions in voluntary bankruptcy have been filed
by persons who never had a business which at any time required indebtedness not easily paid. In such instances the
creditors were more in need of the law's solicitude than were
the petitioners.
When one has been regularly receiving sufficient income
to supply necessaries for himself and family and yet, with an
undiminished earning capacity, plans to obtain a "discharge"
in bankruptcy, it is not difficult to suspect that he willfully
intends to evade payment to those who furnished such goods
and services as contributed to his comfort. In any event, it is
likely that his dentist, grocer, landlady, automobile mechanic
and others can ill afford to remain unpaid and have their just
claims forever barred by the "discharge."
An individual voluntary bankrupt is frequently one
who has always been, still is, and will continue to be sumptuously fed, well dressed, comfortably housed, and surrounded
by friends able and willing to aid him in making business
contacts and profits. Occasionally it may be said of one that
his legalized evasion of debts and prior activities may have
forced, or may drive, others into pauperism, but he himself is
never in the economic category of those whom he derisively
calls "bums."
For the protection of some of the trusting victims of the
seemingly prosperous individual who seeks, through bankruptcy, to repudiate his obligations to those who furnished
him with goods or services, the statute purports to prevent
one form of thievery. It is provided that a discharge shall not
release a bankrupt from "liabilities for obtaining property by
'Revision of article first published in American Bankruptcy Review (N. Y., Nov.,
1935).
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false pretenses or false representations."
Since the guilty
swindler always denies, with pretended indignation, having
made any false pretenses, and since the burden of proof is on
the injured creditor, the practical operation of the protective
clause in question is obviously impeded. If it was easy for
the bankrupt to cheat an unsuspecting friend, it is not too difficult for the culprit to testify falsely. Moreover, if the creditor had been entrapped by artful concealments, it may be impossible for him to prove to the admitted satisfaction of a
court that the non-disclosure of relevant circumstances was
intentional or fraudulent.
Furthermore, many creditors are precluded from showing even the most palpable fraud, because the clause in question literally and actually aids only those who have been
deprived of "property" as the direct result of the bankrupt's
falsehoods. Accordingly, if one obtains by fraudulent representations the indorsement of his promissory note, the claim
of the indorser or surety is barred by the maker's "discharge"
in bankruptcy.2 The indorsement is not "property," within
the meaning of the statute, though it does ultimately result in
the loss of money.
When a schemer first conceives the idea of evading his
financial obligations in the way permitted by the Act, the plan
is, like a plot for an intended perfect crime, kept a secret long
enough for the hatching and consummation of selfish and dishonest schemes. The unscrupulous individual contemplating
bankruptcy may pretend to believe that for him there is legitimate prosperity just around the corner, and with that pretense
proceed to utilize his credit to a full and unconscionable limit.
He shows that he is not without all luxuries enjoyed by solvent persons, even flaunting a latest model automobile in the
hope that it may excite the envy of his frugal neighbors.
With secret knowledge of his insolvency and impending
bankruptcy, the miscreant in question applies for loans from
industrial banks. These wary institutions take no chances,
and require sureties who will give satisfactory answers to an
elaborate financial questionnaire. The applicant, by the aid
of the past and current manifestations of friendship, influences
'Barnes v. Frost (Miss.). 133 So. 119.
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a number of his acquaintances to become sureties on his promissory notes. The money is then received by, and the consequential benefits therefrom inure to, this wily borrower and
no one else. When it is no longer possible to continue such
fiscal operations, he shamelessly files a petition in voluntary
bankruptcy. His air of respectability is not diminished.
The sureties have been, or eventually will be, compelled
to pay the notes of their immune principal. They have no
remedy against a bankrupt without assets. A "discharge"
relieves the latter of the obligations he owes to his sureties,
even if he had obtained their suretyship by false or fraudulent
representations. Obviously, therefore, a flagrant injustice may
be perpetrated within, and permitted by, the Bnakruptcy Act.
It will be possible to find at some first meeting of creditors before the referee that the bankrupt himself is serene and
happy, anticipating enjoyment from his future income, while
keen distress is manifested by the wives of some hapless sureties. One may imagine, if not cite, cases where such women
were aggrieved because they realized that through no fault of
their own the future earnings of their respective husbands
would, in part, be diverted to the banking payees of the bankrupt's notes. In such situations, while the bankrupt was complacently preparing to make rosy his own future, he was
darkening that of his former accommodating, and lately betrayed, associates. Not the once spendthrift and high living
bankrupt, but these honest, industrious and frugal victims
were in danger of becoming embarrassed besiegers of a charitable relief agency. Those who stand in a bread line are not
those to whom a bankruptcy court has granted a "discharge."
If any amendment of the law is contemplated or imminent, the bankrupt's personal sureties and guarantors are
entitled to the first consideration. Under the present law, at
the same time that a bankrupt is relieved by a discharge of a
"burden of debt" his surety, who never had anything to gain
from his principal's prior transactions, is saddled with a part
of this burden and without receiving, as the bankrupt received, any part of the consideration which moved from the
third party. If the suretyship was obtained by fraud, the
situation becomes still more distressing to the surety. The
average person would prefer to have his money stolen directly
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by an execrated thief and thereafter remember only the monetary loss, than to have his funds conventionally filched by a
supposedly upright citizen and then be compelled not only to
bear the tangible loss but also to contemplate the surprising
perfidy of the trusted acquaintance.
One possible and just way of amending the law would
be to enact a provision which would relieve the surety of his
duty to the obligee or payee at the same time that the bankrupt is discharged. Then the burden would fall on the creditor who in some way profited or expected to profit from his
transaction with the bankrupt. This sort of amendment
would conform to. the salutary principle that where one of
two innocent parties must suffer from the fraud of a third, he
who furnishes the means to commit it must bear the loss.
Inasmuch as the plan above suggested would in some
cases be unjust to an obligee or payee, a better amendment
would be one which would make a discharge inapplicable to
any obligation which a bankrupt has incurred with respect to
his sureties or guarantors. When one assumes the status of a
surety, he generally does so because of pressure brought to
bear upon him by the prospective principal. Furthermore,
the latter represents, expressly or impliedly, that he will fulfil
his obligation to the third party and thus save harmless all
concerned. The personal surety usually believes that he is, in
effect, but a well-advised character witness for his principal.
The latter often makes representations and concealments
which induce that belief. When a prospective principal so
commercializes the friendship of an associate as to induce the
latter to assume the burden and responsibility of a surety, he,
the principal, ought to be willing to demonstrate the genuineness of his own professed friendship and the truthfulness of
his representations by striving even for a lifetime, if necessary,
to reimburse his surety whenever the latter is compelled to pay
the debt. An honest principal will do this in spite of a discharge permitting the contrary. A dishonest or an indifferent
one ought to be compelled to remain liable to his surety or
guarantor. This would not be inconsistent with any other
reform, heretofore suggested by others, intended to discourage
dishonesty and to aid creditors.

